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The Phillips curve has flattened out over the last decades. 
We develop a model that rationalizes this phenomenon as 
a result of the observed increase in polarization in many 
industries, a process along which a few top firms gain an 
increasing share of their industry market. In the model, 
firms compete à la Bertrand and there is exit and 
endogenous market entry, as well as optimal up and 
downgrading of technology. Firms with larger market 
shares find optimal to dampen the response of their price 
changes, thus cushioning the shocks to their marginal 
costs through endogenous countercyclical markups. 
Thus, regardless of its causes (technology, competition, 
barriers to entry, etc.), the recent increase in polarization 
in many industries emerges in the model as the key factor 
in explaining the muted responses of inflation to 
movements in the output gap witnessed recently.
SUMMARY FOR THE APRIL RESEARCH UPDATE
In this paper we set up a model consistent with many of 
the features highlighted by the empirical industrial 
organization literature, to argue that these changes might 
be behind the muted response of inflation to shocks to the 
marginal costs that has been observed lately. The flattening 
of the Phillips curve that has taken place over the last 
twenty years poses a challenge for monetary authorities. 
On the other hand, the availability of large data sets 
containing firm level information on a number of relevant 
variables has uncovered a series of facts that speak of 
profound changes in the distribution of firms in many 
industries with repercussion in the response of 
macroeconomic variables to exogenous shocks. 
The pattern of inflation rates across most advanced 
economies in recent years defies the traditional explanations 
based on the Phillips curve relation between inflation and 
the output gap. In spite of the implementation of an 
unprecedented set of non-conventional monetary policy 
measures after the global financial crisis (GFC), inflation and 
inflation expectations in most advanced economies 
remained chronically subdued even before the Covid-19 
crisis. Some argue that this comes from afar and potentially 
well before the GFC (Blanchard, 2016). Prominent among 
the potential explanations for the weak reaction of prices to 
cyclical conditions are the decline of labor power, the rise of 
globalization and international trade, and the impact of 
positive supply shocks caused by new technologies.
These factors do not exhaust the list of possible causes 
behind the diminishing effect of cyclical fluctuations on 
prices. A related strand of literature is placing increasing 
attention on some ongoing significant changes in the 
industrial structure in advanced economies. These changes 
include, among others, the rise in market shares in many 
industries, industrial polarization along different dimensions 
(e.g. firm size, productivity, etc.), the rise in markups, 
intensification of competition spurred by technology and the 
decline of the labor share. In particular, the case for market 
concentration over the last decades has been forcefully 
established on empirical grounds (Covarrubias, Gutiérrez 
and Philippon, 2019). Yet, so far little consensus can be 
found about the likely effect of these factors on the inflation 
rate or, more precisely, on the link between inflation and the 
economic slack (Van Reenen, 2018). The importance of the 
new technological giants in shaping the way economies 
respond to shocks, the archetypal case being the 
disinflationary impact of Amazon, is in stark contrast with 
the long held view in mainstream macroeconomics, 
according to which market concentration has been 
considered a source of inflationary pressure.
Our model sheds light on the connection between the rise 
in market polarization (increase in market shares and 
widening gap in size and productivity across firms in the 
same industry) and the flattening of the Phillips curve. 
Contrary to the previous standard view, in our model the 
rise in market shares is neither inflationary nor deflationary 
per se, but it reduces the slope of the Phillips curve, which 
is consistent with the recent empirical literature (Del Negro, 
Lenza, Primiceri, and Tambalotti, 2020). In particular, the 
slope of the Phillips curve derived in conventional New 
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Keynesian DSGE models (regardless of whether price 
inertia is of the Calvo or the Rotemberg type) gets 
augmented in our model by a factor that decreases with 







































































where  stπ , represents inflation of firms of size s,  
s
tmc , their 
real marginal costs and  sts , their market share.1 
Key to this result is the fact that markups depend positively 
on the firm’s market share. The endogeneity of markups 
hinges critically on the joint effect of two core features of the 
industrial structure of the economy. We assume that firms 
have access to different TFP levels and choose among them 
optimally taking into account the costs of moving up or down 
in the technology ladder. Furthermore, as in Etro and Rossi 
(2015), Andrés and Burriel (2018), and, more recently, Wang 
and Werning (2020), we assume that firms compete à la 
Bertrand taking into account the expected reaction of other 
competitors when setting their prices. Thus, substituting for 
the endogenous market shares in equation (1) and solving, 
we get a Phillips Curve with the usual drivers of inflation, 
expected inflation and marginal costs, pre-multiplied by a 
factor smaller than 1, which depends on the firms’ steady 

























































1  In the model size and productivity level are interchangeable. The 
parameter  sp1 θ−  represents the share of firms that are allowed to 
change their prices every period according to the Calvo price-setting 



































Therefore, when a firm faces a positive shock to its 
marginal cost it raises prices, which in turn undermines its 
market share and hence its desired markup; this dampens 
the inflationary effect of the shock. The strength of this 
effect increases with the firm’s market share. Hence, in an 
economy featuring highly polarized industrial structures, 
with a few large and many small competitors in each 
industry, much in line with the aforementioned recent 
evidence, the response of inflation to shocks becomes 
more muted than it would be in a similar economy with a 
more balanced distribution of firms. In our simulations, 
small variations in the drivers of market concentration 
deliver significant changes in the slope of the Phillips 
curve. While strategic price interactions barely affect the 
markup of smallish firms, they do condition the desired 
markup of large firms in a material manner (Amiti, Itskhoki, 
and Konings, 2019). This moderates the response of 
prices set by the latter to shocks, which in turn (upon 
aggregation) exerts a significant dampening effect on the 
volatility of aggregate inflation. In fact, in the chart below 
we show how a 20% increase in the productivity of larger 
firms, which increases their market share, reduces the 
response of their inflation to a negative TFP shock 
significantly (by 28%), while the response of smaller firms 
to the same TFP shock remains unaltered. As a 
consequence, the response of aggregate inflation is also 
more moderate (by 26%). A similar result is obtained after 
an increase in the degree of competition as measured by 
the elasticity of demand. Moreover, these findings are also 
found for other standard shocks, like an increase in policy 
rates, or negative preference or labour supply shocks.
To further assess the relevance of the mechanism analyzed 
in the paper, we investigate the medium term response of 
the industrial structure to increases in technological 
divergences, the elasticity of substitution among goods 
and barriers to entry, three factors that Covarrubias, 
Gutiérrez and Philippon (2019) identify as the main drivers 
of market concentration in recent decades. The model 
predictions are consistent with the main facts reported by 
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the empirical literature: (1) Sustained increase in 
concentration in most industries (Bajgar, Berlingieri, 
Calligaris, Criscuolo, and Timmis, 2019); (2) concentration 
in employment but less intense than in sales (Autor, Dorn, 
Katz, Patterson, and Van Reenen, 2019); (3) increase in 
polarization along other dimensions like productivity 
(Berlingueri, Blanchenay and Criscuolo (2017); (4) 
sustained increase of markups, mostly at the top of the 
markup distribution (De Loecker, Eeckhout, and Unger 
(2020); (5) steady decline in firm entry in most industries 
(Akcigit and Ates, 2019); (6) generalized fall in investment 
rates in many advanced economies (Eggertsson, Robbins, 
and Wold (2018); and (7) decline in the labor share 
accompanied by a fall in capital share in most industries 
too (Barkai, 2019). 
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IMPULSE RESPONSE OF INFLATION AFTER AN INCREASE IN TFP UNDER DIFFERENT PRODUCTIVITY SCENARIOS
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